CHAPTER I Assignment: Japan
CHAPTER II The Japanese in the War
CHAPTER III Taking One’s Proper Station
CHAPTER IV The Meiji Reform
CHAPTER V Debtor to the Ages and the World
CHAPTER VI Repaying One-Ten-Thousandth
CHAPTER VII The Repayment “Hardest to Bear”
CHAPTER VIII Clearing One’s Name
CHAPTER IX The Circle of Human Feelings
CHAPTER X The Dilemma of Virtue
CHAPTER XI Self-Discipline
CHAPTER XII The Child Learns
CHAPTER XIII The Japanese Since VJ-Day
第一章 任务：日本
第二章 战争中的日本人
第三章 各得其所
第四章 明治维新
第五章 承受历史和社会之恩的人
第六章 报恩于万一
第七章 最难承受的人情债
第八章 维护名誉
第九章 人类情感的世界
第十章 美德的两难处境
第十一章 自我训练
第十二章 孩子的教育
第十三章 投降后的日本人
內容試閱：
CHAPTER I
Assignment: Japan
The JAPANESE were the most alien enemy the United States had ever
fought in an all-out struggle. In no other war with a major foe had
it been necessary to take into account such exceedingly different
habits of acting and thinking. Like Czarist Russia before us in
1905, we were fighting a nation fully armed and trained which did
not belong to the Western cultural tradition. Conventions of war
which Western nations had come to accept as facts of human nature
obviously did not exist for the Japanese. It made the war in the
Pacific more than a series of landings on island beaches, more than
an unsurpassed problem of logistics. It made it a major problem in
the nature of the enemy. We had to understand their behavior in
order to cope with it.
The difficulties were great. During the past seventy-five years
since Japan’ s closed doors were opened, the Japanese have been
described in the most fantastic series of “but also” ever used for
any nation of the world. When a serious observer is writing about
peoples other than the Japanese and says they are unprecedentedly
polite, he is not likely to add, “But also insolent and
overbearing.” When he says people of some nation are incomparably
rigid in their behavior, he does not add, “But also they adapt
themselves readily to extreme innovations.” When he says a people
are submissive, he does not explain too that they are not easily
amenable to control from above. When he says they are loyal and
generous, he does not declare. “But also treacherous and spiteful.”
When he says they are genuinely brave, he does not expatiate on
their timidity. When he says they act out of concern for others’
opinions, he does not then go on to tell that they have a truly
terrifying conscience. When he describes robot-like discipline in
their Army, he does not continue by describing the way the soldiers
in that Army take the bit in their own teeth even to the point of
insubordination. When he describes a people who devote themselves
with passion to Western learning, he does not also enlarge on their
fervid conservatism. When he writes a book on a nation with a
popular cult of aestheticism which gives high honor to actors and
to artists and lavishes art upon the cultivation of chrysanthemums,
that book does not ordinarily have to be supplemented by another
which is devoted to the cult of the sword and the top prestige of
the warrior.
All these contradictions, however, are the warp and woof of books
on Japan. They are true. Both the sword and the chrysanthemum are a
part of the picture. The Japanese are, to the highest degree, both
aggressive and unaggressive, both militaristic and aesthetic, both
insolent and polite, rigid and adaptable, submissive and resentful
of being pushed around, loyal and treacherous. brave and timid,
conservative and hospitable to new ways. They are terribly
concerned about what other people will think of their behavior, and
they are also overcome by guilt when other people know nothing of
their misstep. Their soldiers are disciplined to the hilt but are
also insubordinate.
When it became so important for America to understand Japan,
these contradictions and many others equally blatant could not be
waved aside. Crises were facing us in quick succession. What would
the Japanese do? Was capitulation possible without invasion? Should
we bomb the Emperor’s palace? What could we expect of Japanese
prisoners of war? What should we say in our propaganda to Japanese
troops and to the Japanese homeland which could save the lives of
Americans and lessen Japanese determination to fight to the last
man? There were violent disagreements among those who knew the
Japanese best. When peace came, were the Japanese a people who
would require perpetual martial law to keep them in order? Would
our army have to prepare to fight desperate bitter-enders in every
mountain fastness of Japan? Would there have to be a revolution in
Japan after the order of the French Revolution or the Russian
Revolution before international peace was possible? Who would lead
it? Was the alternative the eradication of the Japanese? It made a
great deal of difference what our judgments were.
In June, 1944, I was assigned to the study of Japan. I was asked
to use all the techniques I could as a cultural anthropologist to
spell out what the Japanese were like. During that early summer our
great offensive against Japan had just begun to show itself in its
true magnitude. People in the United States were still saying that
the war with Japan would last three years, perhaps ten years, more.
In Japan they talked of its lasting one hundred years. Americans,
they said, had had local victories, but New Guinea and the Solomons
were thousands of miles away from their home islands. Their
official communiques had hardly admitted naval defeats and the
Japanese people still regarded themselves as victors.
In June, however, the situation began to change. The second front
was opened in Europe and the military priority which the High
Command had for two years and a half given to the European theater
paid off. The end of the war against Germany was in sight. And in
the Pacific our forces landed on Saipan, a great operation
forecasting eventual Japanese defeat. From then on our soldiers
were to face the Japanese army at constantly closer quarters. And
we knew well, from the fighting in New Guinea, on Guadalcanal, in
Burma, on Attu and Tarawa and Biak, that we were pitted against a
formidable foe.
In June, 1944, therefore, it was important to answer a multitude
of questions about our enemy, Japan. Whether the issue was military
or diplomatic, whether it was raised by questions of high policy or
of leaflets to be dropped behind the Japanese front lines, every
insight was important. In the all-out war Japan was fighting we had
to know, not just the aims and motives of those in power in Tokyo,
not just the long history of Japan, not just economic and military
statistics; we had to know what their government could count on
from the people. We had to try to understand Japanese habits of
thought and emotion and the patterns into which these habits fell.
We had to know the sanctions behind these actions and opinions. We
had to put aside for the moment the premises on which we act as
Americans and to keep ourselves as far as possible from leaping to
the easy conclusion that what we would do in a given situation was
what they would do.
在美国曾经全力以赴作战的敌人中，日本人是我们最不了解的对手。从来没有一场战争中曾有过这么一个主要对手，由于它的行为和思考习惯与我们完全迥异，以至于需要我们对它认真加以考虑。我们就像1905年的沙皇俄国一样，在和一个全副武装并经过严格训练的民族作战，但它并不是西方文化传统中的一员。被西方国家视为人类天性的战争惯例，很明显在日本人那里并不存在。正因为如此，在太平洋的战争并不仅仅是一系列海岸登陆作战，也远比那些后勤上几乎无法解决的难题更加严重。这些困难使得了解敌人天性成为一个主要难题，为了解决它，我们不得不去了解日本人的行为。
困难是巨大的。在75年前，自从日本紧闭的大门被打开后，对日本的描述总是出现在一系列最匪夷所思的作品中，那些作品总是运用“但又”这一固定句型，这在世界上其他任何国家都是没有过的。当一个严肃的观察家在描述日本之外的民族时，他可能会说，“他们是前所未有的礼貌民族”，他不太可能会再加一句“但是他们又傲慢专横”；当他描述一些民族在行为中表现出无与伦比的顽固时，他不会加上一句“但是他们又非常容易适应极端的革新”；当他描述一个民族性情驯服时，他通常不会解释说他们并不是那么容易驯服于上级的控制；当他说他们忠诚且有雅量时，他不会宣称“但是他们又背信弃义、满腹怨恨”；当他说他们天生神勇时，他不会详细叙述他们如何怯懦；当他说这一民族的人完全是按照别人的观点来行事时，他不会接下去说他们怀有一颗真诚得令人吃惊的良心；当他描述说他们的军人都被训练得像机器人时，他不会继续描述那些军队中的士兵如何不服管训，甚至犯上作乱；当他描述说一个民族将自己所有热情都奉献给学习西方时，他不会再详细描述该民族极端热忱的守旧性格；当一个人写了一本书来讲述一个普遍崇尚美感的民族，说他们极端尊敬演员、艺术家，以及丰富的菊花养殖艺术时，他通常不会被迫再写一本书来补充说，这个民族如何崇敬刀剑，以及武士如何具有无上威望。
但是，所有这些矛盾表现，却正是有关日本的论著中的经纬；而且这些都千真万确。刀与菊都是这幅画的组成部分。从最大程度上来说，日本人天生好斗，但又非常温和；穷兵黩武，但又珍视美感；孤介傲慢，但又彬彬有礼；顽固强硬，但又柔顺善变；驯服谦恭，但又不听摆布；非常忠诚，但又易于叛变；天生神勇，但又胆小怯懦；固执守旧，但又顺应潮流。他们极端重视别人怎么看待他们的行为；同时，在发觉别人没有发现他们的过失时，他们为战胜自己的羞耻心而窃喜。他们的士兵被严格训练成武器，但是这些人又富有反抗精神。
当美国了解日本已经成为当务之急时，我们不能将这些矛盾表现和其他一些同样喧嚣的矛盾表现都弃之一旁。严重事态接二连三地出现在我们面前。下一步日本人会怎么办？如果没有攻入其本土，日本会投降吗？我们应该直接轰炸日本皇宫吗？从日本战俘身上我们可以期望得到什么？在针对日本军队和日本本土的宣传中我们应该怎么表达，才能挽救美国人的生命，并且削弱日本人那种战斗到最后一人的信念？这些问题在很多非常了解日本的人中间也都存在着激烈的争论。当和平来临，是不是只有靠永久的军事管制才能保证他们遵守秩序？我们的战士是否要被迫在日本的每一个山口要塞与拼死决战的日本兵战斗到底？在世界和平成为现实之前，日本是否也得来一场革命，就像法国大革命或者俄罗斯革命？谁来领导这场革命？除了根除日本人，还有没有别的替代方式？这些问题也让美国人感到众说纷纭，莫衷
一是。
1944年6月，我被指派研究日本。我接手的任务是，要使用我作为一个文化人类学家的所有技能，来拼出日本人到底像什么。那年夏初，我们针对日本的巨大攻势已经开始展现其真正的威力。美国人仍然在说对日本的战争将要维持3年的时间，也许10年，也许更长；而日本人则认为它会持续一个世纪。他们说尽管美国取得了局部的胜利，但是新几内亚和所罗门群岛离日本本土还有数千英里之遥，他们的官方公报几乎不承认他们在海上的失败。日本人仍然视自己为胜利者。
但是，6月时，形势发生了逆转。在欧洲，第二战场开辟，最高统帅部在两年半时间里一直给予欧洲战场的军事优先权已没有必要再继续下去。结束针对德国的战争已经指日可待。在太平洋上，我们的军队已经在塞班岛登陆[1]，这一军事行动预示着日本彻底的失败。从此以后我们的战士离日本兵越来越近，就要与其短兵相接。从新几内亚、瓜达康纳尔岛、缅甸、阿图、塔拉瓦岛和比耶克岛的战役中，我们清楚知道，我们已经给了可怕的敌人重重一击。
于是，在1944年6月，回答上述一系列关于日本的问题已经变得很迫切。这些问题当中，不管是军事的还是外交的，也不管它是出自最高决策的要求，还是被抛撒在日本前线的传单中所提出的问题，对每一个问题给予深入解答已经很重要。在对日本的战斗中，我们必须要了解的不仅仅是东京当权者们的目的和动议，也不仅仅是日本漫长的历史，也不仅仅是经济和军事的统计资料，我们必须了解的是，日本政府能指望人民做什么？我们不得不尝试去理解日本人的思维和情感习惯，以及这些习惯所形成的模式。我们不得不去了解在他们的行为和观点背后的制约力量。我们不得不将美国人采取行动的前提抛在一边，尽可能不轻率地得出一个结论：在一个给定的条件下，我们怎么做，他们也会怎么做。
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